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Book Review

Commercial Litigation in New York State
Courts (Robert L. Haig, Editor-in-Chief)
Reviewed by Hon. Joseph P. Sullivan
Nary the litigation attorney who, faced with a daunting
legal problem, has not at one time or other asked, "Where do I
start?" Now, however, if that attorney practices in the field of
insurance litigation, a valuable resource and starting point has
emerged in the form of "Commercial Litigation in New York
State Courts," edited by Robert Haig.' The chapter on Insurance Law, 2 written by Kevin J. Walsh, Jennifer B. Bernheim
and Kevin C. Walker, is one of sixteen chapters devoted to litigation issues arising in particular areas of substantive law.
The authors, and Mr. Haig, must be commended as their work
will no doubt become indispensable to those practicing in the
insurance litigation field.
That this work is intended to be utilized as an aid to the
every day practitioner, rather than being an academic treatise
on insurance law, is immediately apparent after reviewing its
table of sections. The chapter is organized into sections which
address both the procedural and substantive aspects of insurance litigation. For example, as a procedural guide to the practitioner, there are sections devoted solely to certain preliminary
considerations that must be addressed in analyzing the potential liability of the insured and insurer; 3 to the threshold prob1. 4 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS (Robert L. Haig ed.,

1995).
2. Kevin J. Walsh et al., Insurance, in 4 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
STATE COURTs 83 (Robert L. Haig ed., 1995).

3. Id. at 85-92.
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lem of lost or destroyed insurance policies; 4 and four
particularly useful sections providing "Checklists" of the essential allegations, as well as the sources of proof, for the most frequently asserted types of claims and defenses in the more
common type of insurance actions.5 Additionally, the final three
sections, which include specimen pleadings,6 jury instructions 7
and forms pertinent to these common claims and defenses,"
present the reader with a broad framework for developing an
effective insurance claim or defense.
The inclusion of these procedural aids does not, however,
diminish the authors' discussion of the substantive issues arising during the course of insurance litigation. Sections are also
devoted to the "non-coverage defenses" asserted by insurers to
avoid coverage such as untimely notice,9 misrepresentation in
the application and failure to cooperate; 0 to the burden of proof
and rules of policy construction in determining the issue of coverage;'" to bad faith actions against insurers;1 2 and to particular
issues regarding coverage in mass tort, product liability and
hazardous waste litigation.' 3 Current federal and New York
state law are effectively cited to support the authors' propositions, and unsettled areas, or conflicts between the jurisdictions, are studiously noted. In short, although the authors note
at the outset that the scope of the chapter was not intended to
extend to all of the substantive areas of insurance law,1 4 the essential areas are comprehensively covered.
Section 52.2, which discusses the preliminary considerations, will be especially useful to the new insurance practitioner, as it may help to avoid costly mistakes or wasted hours
in preparation for litigation. The section focuses on the information that must be amassed before any litigation strategy can
be developed. Identification of other potential defendants, the
4. Id. at 92-96.
5. Id. at 129-36.
6. Id. at 136-40.
7. Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 140-48.
8. Id. at 148-49.
9. Id. at 97-99.
10. Id. at 99-102.
11. Id. at 103-12.
12. Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 120-27.
13. Id. at 112-20.
14. Id. at 85.
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policies of insurance which may cover the particular loss, and
the time periods these policies were in effect are essential first
steps.
The section goes into some detail in its listing of the potential sources of information as to the insurance policies available
for coverage, including the files and employees of the insured,
the records of the insured's legal, insurance and finance departments, the insured's past and present insurance brokers, and
even other insurance companies. The sheer multitude of these
sources reinforces the authors' suggestion that an exhaustive
search may be necessary to determine all possible sources of insurance coverage. 1 5

Appropriately, the section next addresses the cardinal rule
for any holder of an insurance policy in New York state: notify
all your insurers as soon as you become aware that you might
have a claim under their policies. The authors note that New
York favors the insurer with respect to the issue of timeliness of
notice, a requirement being considered a condition precedent to
coverage.' 6 Generally, the timeliness of an insured's notice is
measured by what is reasonable under the circumstances, a
standard which, in the usual case, presents an issue of fact as to
the insured's compliance with the notice provision. Included, as
a practical aid, is a list of what should be included in a notification letter to an insurer where the policy itself makes no provision for the form of the notification.
The last preliminary consideration discussed in this section
is the useful tool of the declaratory action, and its availability
under both federal and state law to resolve coverage issues.
The basic points addressed are the fact that a declaratory action
is the mechanism to resolve disputes between an insurer and an
insured, and that it is available only to those parties.1 7 Additionally, it is noted, at least under a liability policy, that an insurer will be accountable for attorneys fees if it brings a
declaratory judgment action to absolve it of its policy obligations and a determination adverse to it is reached."'
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 86.
Id. at 88.
Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 91.
Id.
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One entire section (section 52.3) is devoted to a discussion
of what an inexperienced practitioner might consider to be an
insurmountable obstacle to insurance coverage: a lost insurance policy. However, the authors succinctly outline the methods by which an insured may prove the existence and terms of a
lost insurance policy.19 Initially, they advise that a lost policy
does not preclude a claim; rather its existence may be proven by
secondary evidence of any kind, including affidavits and records
of brokers and claims adjusters. 20
The authors note that the more difficult problem is proving
the terms of the policy once its existence is established. 2 1
Notwithstanding these difficulties, evidence such as the insurer's use of a standard policy form, proof of premium payments and their method of computation, or evidence of custom
and practice may be sufficient to establish the policy's terms.
The reader is reminded, however, that the insured bears a
heavy burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of demonstrating the existence, delivery, execution and contents of the
lost insurance policy. 22
Having identified the preliminary considerations, the authors delve into a discussion of the three non-coverage defenses
commonly asserted by the insurers: the failure to provide
timely notice of an occurrence; material misrepresentations by
the policyholder in the insurance application; and a breach of
the insured's duty to cooperate with the insurer following the
assertion of a claim (section 52.4). The requirements for each
defense are stated with brevity and clarity, and any practitioner
interested in a quick study of potential defenses that would relieve an insurer of liability would be wise to consult this section.
Although an in-depth discussion of each defense is beyond
the scope of this review, it should be noted that the essential
elements of each defense are included. For example, on the issue of the timeliness of notice, the authors inform us that, unlike many jurisdictions where prejudice must be shown in order
to justify a disclaimer of coverage due to lack of timely notice,
under New York law, as noted, timely notice to the insurer is
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 93-96.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 95.
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considered a condition precedent to an insurer's liability under
the policy.23 Only in those circumstances where an insured can
demonstrate that it did not discover an occurrence despite exercising diligence in keeping itself informed, or where the insured
possessed a good faith belief of non-liability, would untimely notice be excused. 24
Regarding judicial acceptance of excusing late notice of
claim, the authors observe that while the courts have consistently recognized that untimely notice may be excused, they
rarely excuse it.25 It should be noted, however, that several recent appellate cases have upheld excuses by an insured, especially on the grounds that the insured possessed a good faith
belief of non-liability.2 6 Such is the case, for example, where the
loss occurred as a result of an intentional tort or criminal act by
a third party, and a claim is subsequently asserted against the
insured for failing to provide adequate security.
The authors set forth in comprehensive fashion the requirements of a defense based on misrepresentation in an insurance
application. 27 In order to establish that the policy was void ab
initio, the insurer must show that the misrepresentation was
material and was relied upon by the insurer, but it need not
show that the misrepresentation was intentional. Materiality,
we are told, is judged by whether the insurer, absent the misrepresentation, would have refused to issue the policy on the
same terms. The authors note that this standard is codified in
Insurance Law section 3105(b).
While the authors make clear what materiality means in
this context, it would also have been helpful to touch on the issue of what in fact constitutes a "misrepresentation." Some
courts have held that in order to find that a statement on an
insurance application is a misstatement, the questions posed
must be so plain and intelligible that any applicant could readily comprehend them. 28 Thus, while an insurer asserting the
defense of misrepresentation need not prove an intent to
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
180 (3d

Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 98-99.
Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 99-100.
See, e.g., Nadel v. Manhatten Life Ins. Co., 211 A.D.2d 900, 621 N.Y.S.2d
Dep't 1995).
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deceive, courts have recognized that an insured should not forfeit coverage due to poorly worded questions on the insurance
application.
The third non-coverage defense, non-cooperation with the
insurer subsequent to the filing of a claim, also functions as a
condition precedent, voiding coverage if the insured's non-cooperation is intentional, substantial and material. The authors
also point out that the insurer must itself exercise due diligence
in communicating its requirements to the insured, making clear
the nature of the cooperation upon which it insists.
The last section regarding non-coverage defenses pertains
to the insurer's obligations to assert its defenses in a timely
fashion. As the authors demonstrate, the untimely assertion of
a defense by an insurer may result in a waiver, or an estoppel,
regarding that defense. A significant distinction between the
two is indicated, whereby a waiver requires no showing of prejudice to the insured, while estoppel will operate only where, as
in a liability policy, the insured can show that it prejudicially
relied on the insurer's initial undertaking to defend or indemnify it.

Section 52.5, pertaining to the burden of proof and rules of
policy construction in coverage actions, is perhaps the cornerstone of the entire chapter. It focuses on the situation where
the policyholder has already made a prima facie showing of a
loss that falls within the general coverage provisions of the insurance contract; once such a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the insurer to demonstrate the applicability of a
coverage exclusion.
The authors make it eminently clear that the burden on the
insurer of proving that an exclusion applies is a heavy one,
which may also entail proving that an exemption to that exclusion is inapplicable. Thus, the burden is met only where the
insurer shows that the insured's reading of the policy exclusion
is objectively unreasonable, and that its own construction is the
only one that could fairly be placed on the policy. 29
One observation arises in light of the insurer's burden of
proving an exclusion. While at many points in the chapter the
authors note that New York is a "pro-insurer" state, it would
29. Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 104.
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seem that in this aspect of insurance litigation, the rules are
heavily weighted in favor of the insured. Given the authors'
characterization of New York as a pro-insurer state, some discussion as to how these pro-insured rules regarding exclusions
square with the pro-insurer reputation would have been
enlightening.
The section also discusses the issue of contract construction
in determining whether the terms of the insurance contract are
unambiguous on their face, a determination which is to be made
as a matter of law by the court. If the terms are unambiguous,
the court must, as with any contract, enforce the plain meaning
of those words. The pivotal definition of ambiguity in the context of insurance policies is then provided: when words or
phrases are capable of more than a single meaning when
viewed objectively by a person who has examined the entire
agreement, and who is familiar with the customs, practices, and
terminology as understood in the insured's trade or business.
The tradition in New York, it is noted, is that in cases of ambiguity as to coverage, any doubt must be resolved in favor of the
insured and against the insurer. This principle is known as
"contra proferentum."
The authors point out that even though the courts should
be restricted to the words of the policy alone in determining
whether ambiguity exists, in fact they frequently rely on "proinsured" rules of construction to resolve this question. 30 They
cite the principle that courts should attempt to interpret policies in a manner which would provide coverage since that is the
very purpose of insurance, as well as the fundamental axiom
that policy exclusions should be given an interpretation most
beneficial to the insured.3 ' Again, while it is noted that these
principles all run in favor of the insured, especially on a motion
for summary judgment, no analysis is offered as to how this fits
in with the authors' characterization of New York as a pro-insurer state.
The section also discusses the judicial approach if the policy
wording is ambiguous. Only then may the courts rely on extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Extrinsic
30. Id. at 106.
31. Id.
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evidence may include testimony regarding the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the agreement, as well as evidence
of custom and usage, to help demonstrate the intended meaning
of a particular term. It is noted that while the evaluation of this
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent is generally a
question of fact for the jury, the issue may be determined as a
matter of law when the evidence unequivocally resolves the ambiguity and does not raise questions of credibility.
The authors perform a useful service in placing the doctrine
of contra proferentum in its proper perspective. They note that
the dominant approach taken by New York courts is to apply
the doctrine only where the policy is ambiguous, and extrinsic
evidence fails to resolve the ambiguity. Furthermore, the authors identify what may be seen as an exception, the "sophisticated policyholder" concept, to the doctrine. 32 Under the
exception, the courts will not apply contra proferentum where
the insured is a "sophisticated" purchaser of insurance, that is,
one who contributed to the drafting of the policy or had bargaining power comparable to that of the insurer. The reader is advised, however, that this exception has not gained full
acceptance, and even if applied, will be construed narrowly so
that only those policyholders who participate in negotiating the
terms of coverage, regardless of size, will be deemed
sophisticated.
The "reasonable expectations" doctrine is characterized as
an analog to the contra proferentum rule, and broadly states
that if a policy can reasonably be construed in favor of the position asserted by the insured, he or she is entitled to recover on
the policy. The term "reasonable expectations" is defined as
those of an ordinary businessman in the insured's line of
business. 33
In these sections the authors perform a valuable service in
bringing to the reader's attention considerations such as which
party has the burden of proof and which, if any, rules of policy
construction may be utilized by the court, factors which will
likely have great significance on the ultimate coverage determi-

32. Id. at 110-11.
33. Id. at 111-12.
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nation, be it on a motion for summary judgment, or after a trial
of the action.
Section 52.6 of the chapter is addressed to particular issues
regarding coverage in mass tort, product liability and hazardous waste litigation, and is too narrow in scope to warrant a
detailed review here. However, the section does provide a useful analysis of what constitutes an accident or occurrence
within the meaning of the insurance policies; of the "pollution
exclusion" and the "sudden and accidental" exemption to that
exclusion; and the "injury-in-fact" test for determining when
coverage is triggered under a policy.
The last section discussing a substantive topic, section 52.7,
is addressed to the area of bad faith actions against insurers.
The authors describe how the insurer's contractual duty to defend and indemnify also implies a duty of good faith and fair
dealing on the part of the insurer.34 When an insurer breaches
that duty by refusing in bad faith to defend or indemnify, the
insured can bring an action for compensatory damages in excess
of the policy limits. Different types of bad faith actions are identified, the most common of which is based on an insurer's bad
faith refusal to settle a claim within policy limits.
The authors also note that aside from the implied duties of
good faith and fair dealing, two statutory provisions take on relevance in any bad faith assessment. First, Insurance Law section 2601 prohibits unfair claim settlement practices, and
requires a showing that the insurer failed to attempt to obtain a
fair settlement for a claim where liability has become reasonably clear, and that such conduct is frequently engaged in by
the insurer. This statute, the authors note, does not afford a
private right of action. However, the second statute, General
Business Law section 349, does afford a private right of action
to those who can demonstrate that the insurer's bad faith refusal to settle in violation of Insurance Law section 2601 constituted a deceptive act or practice.
The standard for establishing a bad faith refusal to settle a
claim is conduct by the insurer which constitutes a "gross disregard" of the insured's interest, i.e., a deliberate or reckless failure to place the interests of the insured on an equal footing with
34. Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 120-21.
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its own. For a bad faith recovery, however, it must be shown
that liability is clear, and that the potential recovery far exceeded the policy limit.
As the authors point out, only in rare circumstances in New
York will punitive damages be allowed in first-party actions involving the breach of an insurance contract. Only where there
is a showing that the breach is so egregious so as to involve tortious conduct, and that such conduct was part of a pattern
aimed at the public generally, will punitive damages be
allowed. 35
If a practitioner is curious as to the circumstances that will
permit the recovery of attorneys' fees in insurance actions, a
quick answer is provided. An insured may recover such fees
from the insurer only in two circumstances: where a liability
insurer unsuccessfully brings a declaratory action to escape its
coverage obligations and where there has been an unreasonable, bad faith denial of coverage.
The authors have included a short section (section 52.8) regarding discovery in insurance cases. They note that all the
normal discovery devices are, of course, applicable in insurance
actions, but they further draw attention to certain types of documents which might be particularly useful, especially to the insured. For example, documents regarding the drafting history
of the policy and the underwriting and claims handling manuals of the insurer would be useful in providing information as to
what was originally intended by certain policy provisions, and
how the insurer interprets its own policy. Additionally, communications with the insurer's reinsurer, claims filed by other insureds, and information regarding the insurance companies'
reserves would also provide a genuine assessment of the insurer's own expectations as to its own liability exposure. Obviously, this type of information would be extremely useful in
cases involving ambiguity in the policy wording.
The remainder of the chapter (sections 52.9 to 52.15) includes several aids, in the form of checklists, sample pleadings,
sample jury instructions and a model coverage chart and notification letter, which incorporate the substantive legal principles
discussed throughout the chapter. For example, there are
35. Id. at 124.
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checklists for the essential allegations that must be made in an
insured's declaratory judgment action and those required to
support a complaint alleging a bad faith refusal to settle. 36 The
sources of proof necessary to support such allegations are also
listed.3 7 Sample pleadings are included to indicate how the allegations should be structured to achieve a proper format. 38
The sample jury instructions are particularly useful given
their necessary focus on the burden of proof as to the crucial
issues at trial. Sample jury instructions regarding ambiguities
in the insurance contract, proof of lost policies, misrepresentations in an insurance application, timeliness of notice to an insurer, failure to cooperate with the insurer, estoppel from
denying coverage, and a bad faith refusal to settle are
included.3 9
The chapter on Insurance Law will, as indicated, provide a
useful tool for the practitioner confronted with a legal problem
in the field of insurance law. The authors provide a valuable
insight into many of the more common problems in insurance
litigation. After reading the chapter the reader might find it
difficult, as I did, to accept their characterization of New York
as a pro-insurer state, although its jurisprudence does not, to be
sure, reflect the anti-insurer bias of some states. The authors
might also have relied more on New York state court precedents, which provide ample support for the propositions advanced. Generally, the authors' focus is on federal cases.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 130-32.
Id. at 132-34.
Id. at 136-40.
Walsh et al., supra note 2, at 140-47.
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